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III. ARGUMENT 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT THAT THE 
DISTRICT'S FINAL RULES IMPOSE AN IMPACT FEE. 
In this matter, there are two questions presented: (1) whether a special district's 
fee that is required as a condition of putting in a water system—in this case for a possible 
subdivision—is an impact fee even though the special district itself does not grant 
subdivision approval, but does give written authorization to approve the water system; 
a id (2), whether that fee, if it indeed is an impact fee, loses its character as an impact fee 
if .t is collected by a municipality—in this case Toquerville City—in connection with 
wrLten subdivision plat approval by the municipality. The trial court below said yes to 
both questions, determining that in the first instance the fee would be an impact fee, but 
in the second instance, because the fee was collected by a municipality, the special 
district did not give "written authorization" in connection with development approval 
within Me meaning of the statute and therefore the fee was not an impact fee. See R. 
193-195; see also Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102(4). 
As to the first question, the trial court agreed with the argument of Respondent's 
counsel as explained by him at the October 18, 2001 hearing. R. 357, T. 29:12—3L17.1 
The trial co irt rejected Petitioner's argument that installation of a water system does not 
in and of itself create a greater demand for public facilities, R. 357, T. 24:19-23, and 
therefore is not approval of a development activity. The trial court reasoned: 
1
 For the Court': convenience, copies of the cited portions of the transcript are attached as 
Exhibit 1. 
The District [Petitioner] bases much of its argument on the fact that 
it does not encourage developers to apply to it for secondary water 
service and that any such application is "voluntary." The District 
emphasizes that it will not even accept an application without proof 
that the applicant has been refused service by the "community" in 
which the applicant's property is located. Neither of these 
arguments is material to the issue presented to the Court, however. 
The District's Petition prays for the Court to determine whether the 
District's Final Rules impose impact fees, without reference to 
Keystone or any other particular applicant. The District's ability to 
reject an application because, for example, the applicant has not 
been refused service by his community, does not mean that the 
availability fee that the District may have imposed is or is not an 
impact fee. If the Final Rules do improperly impose impact fees, the 
problem is not corrected by the District's insistence that its system 
be the developer's "last resort." Consequently, the Court's 
determination in this case must assume that someone has applied or 
will apply to the District for service under circumstances which 
require the District to make a decision about the application, 
(emphasis in original). 
R. 191, 192. Based upon that assumption that someone will apply for service, which 
assumption again was made in the context of a Petition by the District for declaratory 
relief, and following Keystone's argument the trial court said: 
Keystone first argues that the availability fee is an impact fee 
because (i) the District, which is a local political subdivision, owns 
and operates a secondary water system, which includes public 
facilities for "water supply, treatment, and distribution," and (ii) 
Keystone's construction of a "subdivision secondary water system" 
is "construction or expansion of a . . . structure . . . that creates 
additional demand and need for public facilities" and is, therefore, a 
development activity, (iii) the District requires Keystone to obtain 
the District's written authorization, or development approval, before 
commencing construction of a secondary water system for 
Keystone's property if it is to be connected to the District's system, 
and (iv) Keystone must pay the District's availability fee as a 
condition of obtaining the District's development approval. 
R. 192, 193. 
The Trial court agreed with Keystone that its "construction of the secondary water 
system on its own property creates additional demand and need for public facilities." R. 
193. Accordingly, the District's "availability fee," as reasoned by the trial court, is an 
impact fee as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102(7). In its Responsive Brief, 
however, the District now argues that the Trial court lacked adequate facts upon which to 
base its rulings—both of them—and that the trial court's reasoning is not sound. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
The material facts properly in the record can be summarized as follows: 
1. Petitioner "at all times relevant hereto has been a political subdivision of 
the State of Utah . . . existing . . . by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1401 et seq. and 
is located in Washington County, Utah." R. 1. f 3. 
2. The District owns and manages a secondary water system (the "System") 
which presently supplies secondary irrigation water to residents of the Town of 
Toquerville pursuant to an Agreement for Joint and Cooperative Action by and between 
the District, the Town of Toquerville, and the Toquerville Irrigation Company dated 
December 28, 1998. The System is capable of providing wholesale irrigation water 
within the towns of LaVerkin and Toquerville (the "LaVerkin Creek Area")." R. 2, ^ 5. 
3. The District's primary method of providing water is as a wholesaler to 
municipalities. R. 2, % 4. This it does by written contracts with the municipalities. R. 
357, T. 26:24,25. No impact fee analysis is done. R. 357, T. 26:21-27:18. 
4 The District does not concern itself with the price the municipalities in turn 
charge developers for its water. R. 357, T. 14:13-16 ("We [the District] primarily 
provide water to municipalities. And then they go on and do whatever business they do 
with it. We primarily do that by way of contractual arrangements and the like."); R. 357, 
T. 27:14-18. 
5. In selling water to municipalities under contract, the District does not 
believe it is bound by any provision for reasonableness under the impact fee statute or 
even this Court's analysis in Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 
1981). Rather, in setting the price for the water, because it is based upon contract, it 
believes that its only duty "in passing this fee under [the] water district statute is to be 
rational... .We [the District] can't be so irrational that it would be appropriate for a court 
to come in and substitute its judgment for the judgment of our court [board]." R. 357, T. 
27:23-28:3. 
6. At some point, "it became apparent to [the District] that Keystone 
Development would be likely coming to the District rather than to TSWS to obtain 
secondary... water service." R. 357, T. 15:12-15. This was probably because Keystone 
claims it has an agreement with the District directly to provide water—at least the District 
admitted that that was the basis for the District's putting together its Rules, creating its 
availability fee, and then filing the present Petition with the District Court. R. 357, T. 
35:13-17,36:19,20. 
TSWS—Toquerville Secondary Water System—is an entity that deals with delivery of 
secondary water through a secondary water system to residents of Toquerville, composed 
of a board with two members appointed by the District, two members appointed by the 
City, and a fifth member appointed by the four existing members. It is based upon a 
contract for delivery of water between the District and the City of Toquerville. R. 357, T. 
7. Regardless of the reason why the District sought judicial approval of its fee, 
the District nonetheless filed its Petition attaching a copy of its rules, seeking "a Section 
1442 'judicial examination and determination' pertaining to its availability fee, regardless 
of who applies to it for service." R. 193 n.2; see also R. 1-4. 
8. Respondent, Keystone, is a property owner and developer within the City 
of Toquerville and "is required to have a secondary water system in place in order to 
obtain subdivision development approval from Toquerville." R. 190. Petitioner does not 
object to this finding by the trial court. Brief of Appellee, at 35. 
9. If Keystone does not purchase secondary water directly from the District, it 
will purchase water from TSWS or Toquerville to develop its property. R. 357, T. 13-
15. In that event, it will pay a fee for the water in connection with receiving written 
subdivision approval. This fee is based upon the contract the municipality has with the 
District. No impact fee analysis is done. The District "provide[s] water to [the] 
municipality[]. And then they go on and do whatever business they do with it." R. 357, 
14:14-15. 
Based upon these facts the trial court concluded that the fee "somebody" would 
have to pay if they purchased water directly from the District was an impact fee under the 
statute. The Trial court's legal conclusions were correct. "Public facilities" within the 
meaning of the Impact Fee Act, "means . . . capital facilities that have a life expectancy 
often or more years and are owned or operated by or on behalf of a local political 
14:20-15:10. It receives its water from the "System" referred to in paragraph 5 of the 
District's Petition. R. 2 f 5. 
subdivisio 1 . . . [involving] water rights and water supply, treatment, and distribution 
facilities." Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102(12). The District's "System" referred to in 
paragraph 5 of its Petition, is a public facility. See also R. 357, T. 9:25-10:1, 20:15-18, 
22:17-24. 
Moreover, the District itself is a "local political subdivision" within the meaning 
of the Impact Fee Act because it is a "special district created under Title 17A, Special 
Districts." Utah Code Ann. § ll-36-102(8)(a). See also Material Fact No. 1 above. 
Construction of a "structure, or use, [or] any change in use of . . . a structure" as 
required by the District's Rules, see R. 7 fflf 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, "that creates additional demand 
and need for public facilities" is a "development activity." Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-
102(3). The trial court correctly concluded that the construction of a secondary water 
system to meet the District's specifications was a development activity within the 
meaning of the Impact Fee Act. "Even if the District had so much existing service 
capacity that it could absorb new connections without expanding its system, any 
construction of new subdivision facilities which were to be connected to the District's 
system would create additional demand on the District's system." R. 193 (emphasis in 
original). Hence, the District's Rules regulate a "development activity." 
Finally, the District will not allow connection to its system unless it inspects and 
approves construction of the system "during installation." R. 11 f 10. This will only take 
place if the applicant signs a water application and agreement with the District. R. 8 f 3. 
Hence, the District's Rules provide for "development approval" within the meaning of 
the Impact Fee Act. Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded, if the District 
supplies water directly to "somebody" rather than to a municipality, and collects a fee 
consistent with its Rules attached to its Petition, that fee is an impact fee because it is "a 
payment of money imposed upon development activity as a condition of develoment 
approval." Utah Code Ann. § ll-36-102(7)(a). Regardless how the Petitioner would 
have this Court look at the facts in light of the Impact Fee Act, the availability fee 
imposed by the Petitioner directly upon "someone" other than a municipality is an impact 
fee. The trial court was precisely correct in its legal analysis and conclusion regarding 
the first question presented. Accordingly, the trial court's decision as to the first question 
presented should be affirmed. 
Now, by way of specific response to some of the arguments made by Petitioner in 
its Brief, whether Keystone's Trial Memorandum and its exhibits are admissible as 
evidence or not makes little difference in light of the Material Facts outlined above. The 
parties did not present evidence at the hearing on October 18, 2001, except by way of 
proffer, because the parties at the hearing did not believe "the evidence . . . [was] in 
dispute." R. 357, T.12:22. The trial court took the proffers of counsel along with 
argument. That forms the basis of the record on appeal. Further, it is somewhat 
disingenuous for Petitioner to argue that Respondent's Trial Memorandum should have 
been ignored by the Court. Petitioner's counsel responded to the points raised in it 
throughout Petitioner's presentation. See e ^ R. 357, T. 16:25, T. 17:21, 22, T. 18:9, 
10, T. 23:23, 24, T. 25: 8-15. Moreover, for what it's worth, the Trial Memorandum was 
not late as the trial court suggested. This was a hearing on a Petition, not a motion 
hearing requiring courtesy copies to the court beforehand. A trial memorandum was not 
even required, but was submitted strictly to assist the trial court. And indeed, the trial 
court did rely on the Trial Memorandum. R. 190 f b. 
Notwithstanding, given the Material Facts summarized above, which are entirely 
supported either by the Petition or by proffers from Petitioner's counsel, the "facts" in the 
Trial Memorandum are unnecessary. Nevertheless, if this Court finds that reference to 
those facts is needed and that they are not properly in the record, this Court should 
remand this matter with specific instructions regarding the legal issues raised in the 
Petition. See Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, f 22, 20 P.3d 388; Bakanowski 
v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App. 357, f 15, 80 P.3d 153. Respondent will have little 
difficulty entering into evidence the contracts, city ordinances, etc., that are exhibits in 
the Trial Memorandum. 
In addition, the District claims that "[n]othing in Keystone's unfounded 
allegations suggest that there might be even one connection to the District's system, 
much less enough applicants to impact that system." Brief of Appellee at 38. The Trial 
court flatly and properly rejected that argument. R. 191, 192. Keystone does not need to 
prove that there will be a connection. The fact that someone will connect to the District's 
system must be assumed otherwise the District's Petition is pointless. They are asking 
this Court to tell them that their rules which set forth the conditions for water use and 
connection to their system, are not impact fees, and now they say this Court and the trial 
court cannot assume someone might get their water? Why is the District filing a Petition 
with the trial court, seeking a declaratory ruling, if there is no chance of "even one 
connection to the District's system?" Brief of Appellee at 38. 
The District attempts to bog this Court down in a debate over whether or not 'wa 
'need' would be created for the District to add more facilities to its system" and whether 
or not the Trial court's Ruling could support such a finding. This debate is entirely 
beside the point. The issue is if "someone" connects to the system. This "someone" 
connecting to the system has already been anticipated by the District and is the very 
purpose of the District's Rules and Petition being filed.3 
The District is simply talking out of both sides of its mouth attempting to confuse 
this Court. The fact is its availability fee clearly falls within the definition of an impact 
fee and the trial court's conclusions in this regard should be affirmed. 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLARE THE DISTRICT'S PASS-THROUGH FEE AN 
IMPACT FEE BASED UPON THE RECORD BEFORE IT; BUT IF NOT, THIS COURT 
SHOULD REMAND TO THE TRIAL COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW 
SPECIFICALLY AS IT RELATES TO A PASS-THROUGH FEE. 
1. A Pass-Through Fee is an Impact Fee. 
With the first question presented having been answered in the affirmative, namely, 
that the District's fee charged directly to someone requesting service from its system as 
more particularly described in its Rules, is an impact fee, then the next question becomes 
relevant: Does that fee change its character if it is collected by a municipality instead of 
the District in connection with subdivision approval? 
This issue was squarely raised below by Keystone. See Keystone's Complaint, 
copy attached to Appellant's blue brief as Exhibit 1, e.g., fflf 16, 32-34, 40 n.7; see also 
R. 64-68; R. 357, T. 59:15-60:9. Further, this point was argued extensively by Petitioner. 
3
 Even by the District's own admission, this "someone" is probably Keystone. R. 357, T. 
R. 357, T. 16:22-17:2, 26:17-27:5, 69:6-70:20. Moreover, the Trial court ruled on this 
issue and reasoned as follows: 
Keystone's alternative argument is that (i) Toquerville will not 
approve Keystone's subdivision activity unless Keystone has a 
secondary water system; (ii) the District has the only secondary 
water system from which Keystone could obtain service, (iii) the 
District will not allow Keystone to obtain service unless Keystone 
pays the availability fee, and (iv) the statutory definition of "impact 
fee" as one imposed "as a condition of development approval" does 
not require that the fee be demanded by or paid to the body giving 
the development approval. This argument does not appear to be 
sound. If Keystone's "development activity" is the subdivision 
generally, and if Keystone must apply to the District for service 
because no other such service is available and that service is a 
condition of Toquerville's approval of Keystone's subdivision, the 
District's approval of Keystone's application is a necessary predicate 
to Toquerville's approval of the subdivision but it is not a "written 
authorization . . . that authorizes the commencement of development 
activity" and, therefore, the District's approval is not "development 
approval." Even though, contrary to the District's argument, the 
District's approval of an application for secondary water service 
does affect the municipality's subdivision development approval, it 
does not constitute "development approvel" which would make the 
District's availability fee constitute an impact fee. (footnote 
omitted). 
R. 194, 195. The Trial court compared this fee to a fee a developer would pay for 
a "contractor's license and a business license in order to obtain Toquerville's approval of 
the developer's subdivision" and stated that that "would not mean that the fees paid to the 
State Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing for the contractor's license 
and to the Town Clerk for the business license are 'impact fees.'" R. 194 n.3. 
The facts relied upon by the Trial court in the above analysis were included in the 
record. Fact no. (i) was not objected to by Petitioner in its brief. Brief of Appellee at 35. 
36:19,20. 
As to fact no. (i), it is not necessarily in the record that the District has the "only" 
secondary water system, but it does have a system, Material Fact nos. 2, 6 and 8, and as 
the trial court said: "the Court's determination in this case must assume that someone has 
applied or will apply to the District for service under circumstances which require the 
District to make a decision about the application.5' R. 192. Fact no. (iii) above is 
apparent from the District's Rules attached to its Petition. R. 7 f^ 4. Finally, fact no. (iv) 
is a mere recitation and analysis of the Impact Fee Act. No evidentiary support is needed. 
Accordingly, this argument is not unsupported in the record. Neither is it based upon 
unreasonable assumptions as Petitioner would suggest. 
In its analysis, however, the trial court was plainly in error. The fee for a 
contractor's license or a business license is unlike the fee paid for the District's water: it 
is not paid as a condition or using the Trial court's words "a necessary predicate" to 
subdivision plat approval. R. 194. The developer has only one reason for paying the fee 
o Toquerville for the water: obtaining secondary water so his subdivision will be 
J pproved. A developer might have a myriad other reasons for obtaining a contractor's 
1 cense or a business license that may never involve subdivision plat approval. Again, 
"
r
 ^oquerville will not approve Keystone's subdivision development activity unless 
KA ystone has a secondary water system." Fact no. (i) above. R. 194. Approval of the 
subdivision, including the water system therein, is a "development activity" within in the 
plaLi language of the Impact Fee Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-36-102(3) and (12). 
"Wri ten authorization from a local political subdivision" includes written authorization 
from the "municipality," i.e., Toquerville. Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-36-102(4) and (8). 
Moreover, this fee is unlike what would be paid to a utility company although 
installation of the utilities and connection to their service may likewise be a condition for 
subdivision approval. Utilities are carefully regulated by the state. Their fees are 
monitored. Further, they are not "local political subdivisions" within the Impact Fees 
Act. Utah Code Ann. § 1 l-36-102(8)(a). Consequently, an analogy to a utility company 
is inapposite. 
Nothing in the Impact Fees Act, and Petitioner has pointed to nothing, suggests 
that the local political subdivision that authorizes the development activity must be the 
same local political subdivision that imposes conditions that govern the development 
activity. Nothing in the Impact Fees Act requires that the local political subdivision 
collecting the fee cannot do so on behalf of the local political subdivision that imposes 
conditions that govern the development activity. Local political subdivisions collect fees 
for each other frequently, such as the case of a municipality and a special service district, 
while at the same time, it is the service district that regulates the particular development 
activity, e.g., special service districts for sewer or water. Petitioner recognized this at the 
hearing before the Trial court. R. 357, T. 69:6-70:20. Moreover, an example of this is in 
the statute itself. Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-202(8). The statutory definition of an impact 
fee merely refers to a "condition of development approval" with no reference to who sets 
the conditions. 
Accordingly, this Court should rule that the answer to the second question 
presented is that a fee paid as a condition of development approval does not lose its 
character as an impact fee even though it is collected by another local political 
subdivision. 
Petitioner may argue, as it did before the trial court, that Keystone will not be 
coming to the District for secondary water because the District fulfilled its contract with 
Keystone by implementing the TSWS. Keystone must come to TSWS to receive its 
water. See R. 357, T. 36:13-17, 19, 20. First, in response to that argument, that fact if it 
were true, is immaterial to the District's Petition. This Court, as did the trial court, must 
assume that someone will be coming to the District for secondary water. Second, even 
assuming that fact to be true, the District cannot side step the requirements of the Impact 
Fee Act because it sets its fee by contract with municipalities and "then they go on and do 
whatever business they do with it." £ee Material Fact No. 4 above. Nothing in the 
Impact Fees Act states that the fee paid to the local service district must be pro rated to 
what the municipality received for the water. As long as the Petitioner receives a fee for 
its water and the use of its system, and as long as that water and system is a condition of 
obtaining subdivision plat approval, the fee collected from the developer is an impact fee. 
Indeed, the District has been charging municipalities in Washington County for its 
water and use of its system for some time. R. 357, T. 26:22-25, 27:17,18. Such a pass-
through fee, according to the District, "would not be an impact fee under the terms of the 
Impact Fees Act." Brief of Appellee at 15. Accordingly, the District believes it can and 
indeed has charged whatever it felt appropriate for its water, Material Fact No. 5 above, 
without complying with the impact fees analysis or even the requirements articulated by 
this Court in Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981). This 
contract fee is then paid to the District and nobody is the wiser. See e.g., R. 301 f 2; R. 
303 (Ron Thompson, the District's manager, see also R. 357, T. 9:19-11:4, is 
^particularly concerned that the Town [of Toquerville] has not implemented the 
agreement by adopting the schedule of impact and other fees required by the agreement 
and may have approved additional hookups to its system without properly notifying the 
WCWCD and submitting the agreed upon fees. In regard to Calvin Lowe's subdivision 
the Town is obligated under the agreement to pay the District a $1,500 water connection 
fee for each lot in the subdivision within six months after approval of the subdivision 
plat.") and compare R. 117 ^ f and R. 125. Nothing in the plain language of the Impact 
Fee Act would suggest that a local political subdivision does not need to comply with the 
act if it collects its fee from the authorizing political subdivision by contract. Whether 
Keystone or "someone" pays the fee to the District directly for its water and use of its 
system in connection with subdivision plat approval, or whether they pay the fee to a 
municipality that gives it to the District pursuant to a contract, the fee paid is an impact 
fee. 
2. THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER ALL THE FACTS IN THE RECORD 
INCLUDING THE FACTS AND EXHIBITS SET FORTH IN KEYSTONE'S TRIAL 
MEMORANDUM; IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND 
THIS CASE WITH INSTRUCTIONS "TO POINT OUT, AND ADDRESS, ISSUES 
WHICH MAY BECOME MATERIAL ON REMAND." BANKANOWSKIV. 
BANKANOWSKI, 2003 UT APP 357 f 15. 
The record at the trial court level evinces that all parties, including the trial court, 
were confused as to the procedure required by Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1442. R. 357, T. 
5:8-11, 8:14 through 9:34, 7-10. Prior to the Trial court's ruling, there was confusion as to 
what the procedure was for hearing the District's Petition. Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-
1442 appears to say that the District files its Petition, gives notice, and then anybody who 
wants to can show up for the trial, without any indication of an opportunity for discovery 
or depositions. In the case at hand, Keystone was the only one who showed up to the 
hearing. Notice of Petition and Hearing was sent out on August 15, 2001, and the trial 
against all unknown entities or persons took place on October 18, 2001. R. 31-32. With 
only nine weeks from petition to trial on such complicated matters, there is no time for all 
affected persons and entities to find and hire counsel, file answers and conduct discovery 
and depositions. If all of these basic rights normally afforded to Respondents/Defendants 
do not exist under Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1442, then the trial court cannot be said to 
have erred by considering Keystone's trial memorandum and accompanying exhibits. 
At the trial before the trial court on October 18, 2001, both parties made reference 
to and arguments based on the exhibits attached to both the petition and the trial 
memorandum. Neither party objected to the other party's referencing of these exhibits, 
and neither party specifically moved to have said exhibits admitted into evidence. See R. 
357. T. 16:25, 17:21, 22, T. 18:9,10, T. 23:23, 24, T. 25;8-15, T. 29:12-31:7. The District 
now claims there is no foundation for Keystone's exhibits. If this is the case, the same 
holds true for the exhibits in the District's Petition. The District argues that their exhibits 
are acceptable because they were attached to a verified petition, even though no 
4
 Even though this quote is attributed to the District's counsel, it appears that it is actually 
the trial court speaking at some point. Keystone believes that began on page 8, line 14. 
foundation or testiniony was given at the hearing, but that Keystone's Trial Memorandum 
exhibits should not be considered, even though Keystone was at the hearing and prepared 
to lay foundation for the documents. The District cannot have it both ways. To follow 
the District's argument would force this Court to conclude that the entire trial court 
proceeding would have to be thrown out and the parties should then go back to square 
one for a new trial. If this Court does find such to be the case, this Court should remand 
with specific instructions on Section 1442 so all parties and the trial court know what 
procedure to follow under this statute. 
Clearly the trial court was troubled by the nature of the proceedings. Thus it was 
not in error for the trial court to consider all possible scenarios and reasonable 
hypotheticals as to how someone might come to the District for water under its rules— 
cither directly '"just because" or directly in connection with subdivision approval through 
a municipality. The trial court, in evaluating Keystone's trial memorandum and exhibits 
diil not have to believe the facts to be true or authentic, but merely whether they raise a 
rea: onable scenario that may arise when deciding on a judgment of a declaratory nature. 
Keystone, being the only entity to "appear and demur," suggested that the trial 
court continue the matter. "And so, as far as between us, we would prefer to continue the 
matter intil the court has time to review the trial memorandum until the court has time to 
be more prepared to go through and see what we have here." R. 357, T. 6:23-7:1. 
Nevertheess, the trial court proceeded and Keystone still prevailed in defeating the 
District's Petition. It is simply unfair for the District to say now what Keystone "should 
have" or "could have" done at the hearing, when the District and trial court did not know 
the proper procedure. Keystone followed the statute, in that it any "owner of property in 
the district or person interested in the contract or proposed contract may appear and 
demur to or answer the petition at any time prior to the date fixed for the hearing or 
within such further time as may be allowed by the court." Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-
1442. 
Finally, section 1442 states that the "court shall disregard any error, irregularity or 
omission which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." (emphasis added). 
Keystone is uncertain as to what this is supposed to mean, but if there was any 
irregularity by the trial court's later considering Keystone's Trial Memorandum, then 
perhaps the trial court doing so falls under this section. The District's "substantial rights" 
were not affected by the trial court's later considering Keystone's Trial Memorandum 
once the trial court better understood the process, or lack thereof, pursuant to the statute. 
Regardless of what the trial court did or did not consider, Keystone believes that 
this Court can affirm the finding of an impact fee in that the only requirements was for 
the trial court to look at the District's Rules, look at the Impact Fee Act, and determine 
whether there was an impact fee. The trial court did so, and the District failed to 
convince the trial court that its availability fee was not an impact fee. 
In addition to the Petition, the District also submitted Final Rules and Regulations 
for Secondary Retain Water Service for the La Verkin Creek Area, and the Availability, 
User & Standby Fee Analysis for the Washington County Water Conservancy District -
La Verkin Creek Irrigation System. R. 7-30. Based on the Petition and these documents 
alone, the trial court could have determined that the fees to be imposed were impact fees 
under the Impact Fees Act given that the District has admitted that "Keystone is required 
to have a secondary water system in place in order to obtain subdivision development 
approval from Toquerville Town." Brief of Appellee p. 35. 
Finally, the record clearly shows that the trial court conferred with counsel in an 
off the record discussion to work out the facts in the trial court's mind. R. 185. It was 
after this discussion that the trial court issued its Ruling. 
In the event this Court concludes that the record before it is inadequate, it should 
remand this case with instructions to the trial court addressing both questions presented: 
First, what does the Impact Fee Act require for an impact fee if Keystone comes directly 
to the District for water under the District's Rules, and second, is that fee still an impact 
fee if Keystone comes to the District for water as a condition of subdivision approval, 
when the approval is granted by a municipality. Further, and thirdly, because the District 
has made clear that it sells water to municipalities by contract—throughout Washington 
County, R. 26:22-25, R.27:17, 18—and that it washes its hands then of the fee the 
municipality charges (which argument is somewhat disingenuous given the Lowe 
Affidavit, R. 300), and because that is an issue that affects most if not all residents of 
Washington County and a recurring issue, this Court has a duty to address this issue on 
remand as well. 
Citing this Court's decision in Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, the 
Utah Court of Appeals, when dealing with an issue that was certain to resurface on 
remand said: 
Because this issue is certain to resurface on remand and because the 
parties cite the inclusion of savings alimony as a recurring topic in 
alimony disputes, we will address whether savings/retirement 
deposits may ever be considered as part of the needs analysis in an 
alimony determination. 
2003 UT App 357 f 15. Then citing Bair, the Court of Appeals said: "[A]n appellate 
court has a duty to point out, and address, issues which may become material on remand 
even where a separate issue was dispositive to the resolution of the appeal." Id. So it is 
with the above three issues. If this Court finds that the record before it is inadequate to 
make a decision on the above issues, it should remand this case for further proceedings 
before the trial court, but in doing so—it is clear how the trial court would rule below— 
this Court must give legal guidance and address these issues. The District cannot be 
allowed to side step the requirements of the Impact Fees Act by entering into contracts 
with municipalities and then ignore the plain language of the Act. 
3. This Matter is Ripe for Decision. 
One of two options must be the case: (1) either somebody cannot get secondary 
water from Toquerville and therefore they come to the District or (2) the District created 
its Rules, and then proceeded to file a Petition with the courts seeking declaratory relief 
for absolutely no reason. The trial court, finding the first option to be more pliable, found 
that uthe Court's determination in this case must assume that someone has applied or will 
apply to the District for service under circumstances which require the District to make a 
decision about the application." R. 192. 
The District argues that this matter is not ripe for adjudication because Keystone 
has not asked the District for water, and has neither been asked to nor paid a upass 
through fee." Brief of Appellee, at 26. The District cites several cases to support its 
position as to when an issue becomes ripe. However, the issue at hand is different than 
the District's cited cases because those cases were not brought, in part, under Utah Code 
17A-2-1442. That statute allows the District to file Petitions seeking declaratory relief 
allowing a "judicial examination and determination of . . . proceeding or contract of the 
district, whether or not the contract shall have been executed, including proposed 
contracts . . . and the petition shall be taken as confessed by all persons who fail so to 
appear."5 Thus, if Keystone had done as the District suggests by waiting until it received 
a bill from the District, the District would be before this Court arguing that it is too late to 
challenge the fee because the District's petition would have already been "confessed" 
against Keystone. This matter is ripe for this Court's decision. 
C. KEYSTONE SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
The District argues that Keystone should not be awarded its attorneys' fees 
because the matter at hand "was brought by the District pursuant to Section 1442. It was 
not brought under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-401." Brief of Appellee p. 32. However, this 
argument would require this Court to find it possible for the trial court to issue a 
declaratory judgment on whether or not the District's Rules constituted an impact fee, 
without taking into account the "Impact Fees Act" of Title 11, Chapter 36. 
Furthermore, in addition to Section 1442, Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq. is 
the foundation for both the District's Petition and Keystone's Complaint. 
5
 It is also worth noting that Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1442 was enacted in 2000, which 
is after all the District's cited cases in support of its position. 
1. The District's Entire Claim for Relief in its Petition is Based 
Upon Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq. 
The District claims that the issue of whether or not their Rules constituted an 
impact fee, was "not brought under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-401." Brief of Appellee at 
32. This is contrary to the District's own Petition. In fact, the District's entire "Claim for 
:lelief' in its Petition is based upon the Impact Fee Act: 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests the court to determine and 
declare that the "Final Rules and Regulations for Secondary Retail Water 
Service for the La Verkin Creek Area" as amended on July 17, 2001, do not 
impose impact fees under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq. and that the 
Rules are within the power of the District and constitute a valid act 
pursuant to a valid proceeding of the District, (emphasis supplied). 
R. 4. Furthermore, Paragraph 10 of the District's Petition further states as follows: 
Utah Code Ann. § 1 l-36-102(7)(a) states: 
"Impact fee" means a payment of money imposed upon 
development activity as a condition of development approval. 
R. 3. F nally, Paragraph 12 of the District's Petition states that the "fees charged 
by the D;strict under the Rules are not impact fees under Utah Code § 11-36-101 
et seq." Jc 4. The Trial court clearly disagreed with the District, finding that the 
"District's availability fee does constitute an impact fee under the Impact Fees 
Act." R. 11 3-194 (emphasis added). 
Because the Impact Fees Act is the basis of the District's Petition as well as the 
Trial court's luling, Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-401(5), which allows for attorneys' fees 
under the Act is applicable. Keystone believes that the trial court erred in failing to 
award Keyston i its attorneys' fees. The District filed its Petition against an unknown and 
unascertainable number of Respondents. Keystone alone appeared to challenge the 
District's Petition, and prevailed. It should not be the responsibility of private individuals 
and/or businesses to force quasi-governmental entities to obey the laws set by the 
Legislature. Nevertheless, Keystone was forced to do so, and prevailed. For this reason, 
Keystone should be awarded its attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-
401(5). 
2. Keystone's Complaint also seeks a Declaration Under Utah Code 
Ann. § 11-36-101 et. seq. 
Keystone's Complaint also seeks relief under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq., 
further supporting Keystone's claim that the trial court erred in failing to award Keystone 
its attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-401(5). The District attempts to 
discredit Keystone's claim for attorneys' fees in that "[n]owhere does the complaint cite 
to 11-36-401(1) or (4) as the basis for Keystone's standing to sue." Brief of Appellee at 
32. In making such a statement, the District ignores Keystone's prayer for relief which 
seeks "a declaration that Defendant's fee is an impact fee subject to the Utah Impact Fee 
Act," i.e., Utah Code Ann § 11-36-101 et seq. References to Title 11, Chapter 36 of the 
Utah Code are additionally found in Paragraphs 7, 9, 10, 12, 20, 37, 40, 41, 42c, and 43 
of Keystone's Complaint. See Brief of Appellant Exhibit 1. Keystone's Complaint 
further prayed for "an award of attorney's fees as allowed by law." See id. at 14. The 
District's claim that Keystone should be denied its attorneys' fees for failing to 
specifically cite Section 401 is disingenuous. 
The District contends that no "proceedings have been held pursuant to Keystone's 
complaint." Brief of Appellee at 32. This is simply untrue. Keystone's first cause of 
action was to seek a declaration that the District's "fee is an impact fee subject to the 
Utah Impact Fee Act." Brief of Appellant, Exhibit 1 f 43. The trial court's Ruling then 
found that the "District's availability fee does constitute an impact fee under the Impact 
Fees Act." R. 191-194. 
At the beginning of the trial court's hearing on October 18, 2001, the trial court 
recognized that there were "a couple of consolidated cases," that being the District's 
Petition and Keystone's Complaint, which had been consolidated pursuant to an Order to 
Consolidate. R. 35; R. 357, T. 3:9,10. At the hearing on October 18th, the parties agreed 
that the hearing would be limited to "the issue of whether or not the fees that [the District 
has] imposed meet the statutory definition of what is an impact fee." R. 357, T. 4:10-11; 
see also R. 146. Surely the District does not suggest that the October 18, 2001 Order that 
limits the issues to "the legal question of whether or not the fee imposed by the . . . 
District as part of its Rules . . . is or is not an impact fee" means that that issue was 
decided on the basis of the Petition alone, excluding the first cause of action in 
Keystone's Complaint. R. 146. The impact fee issue was specifically part of the hearing 
on October 18th; it was only "all other issues" that were left for later determination. Id. 
The District's Petition sought a ruling that their fee was not an impact fee. Keystone 
sought a ruling that the District's fee was an impact fee. The District now attempts to 
argue that only the District's Petition was at issue as to whether or not the fee was an 
impact fee. Such logic means that Keystone's position on the impact fee would be 
reserved for a later date, even though it was the same issue as found in the District's 
Petition. Surely it was neither the parties', nor the trial court's, intent to determine 
whether or not the District's fee was an impact fee, only so that they could all once again 
determine the same issue at a later date. 
Finally, the District argues that Keystone's Complaint "has never been perfected 
or heard, because the District's motion to dismiss that complaint has never been ruled 
on." Brief of Appellee p. 32. This is simply not the case in that at the time the District's 
motion was filed, the trial court had already heard Keystone's Complaint with respect to 
its first cause of action regarding the impact fees. 
The trial court consolidated the District's Petition and Keystone's Complaint, via 
an Order to Consolidate on September 18, 2001. R. 35. The trial court then had a 
hearing on October 18, 2001, regarding the District's Petition, and the first cause of 
action of Keystone's Complaint, as they related of the issue of impact fees. R. 357. The 
District then filed its motion to dismiss in lieu of an Answer on October 30, 2001. R. 
147. Keystone filed its response on November 21, 2001, and the District filed its reply 
on December 10, 2001. R. 156, 174. The trial court then issued its Ruling agreeing with 
Keystone and granting relief on Keystone's First Cause of Action on January 15, 2002, 
thus effectively ruling on the District's motion, rending said motion moot. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The trial court's ruling that the District's Water Availability Fee imposed by its 
Rules is an impact fee should be affirmed. The trial court erred, however, in finding that 
that fee loses its character as an impact fee if the written authorization for development 
activity is granted by another local political subdivision, such as a municipality. 
Moreover, the District should not be allowed to circumvent the Impact Fees Act by 
entering into contracts with local municipalities and then washing its hands from what the 
local municipalities charge for the District's water. If this Court is persuaded that the 
record is inadequate to rule on these issues, it should rule on what it can and remand to 
the trial court with instructions and legal analysis on these issues. Finally, Keystone 
should be awarded its attorney's fees and costs for successfully defending the District's 
Petition as well as successfully bringing its own Complaint, and should further be 
awarded its attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
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2 PROCEEDINGS 
3 THE COURT: Just now time to move on to the case of 
4 Washington County Water Conservancy District and Keystone 
5 Conversions, LLC. 
6 (Whereupon, an off the record discussion took place.) 
7 THE COURT: Now, on the water conservancy district vs. 
8 Keystone, Hjelle is here for the petitioner, Mr. Reece for the 
9 respondent. There, apparently, are a couple of consolidated 
10 cases. I have case file for number 1616. And I don't know 
11 what this case is about or what you are planning to do today. 
12 MS. HJELLE: Your Honor? 
13 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
14 MS. HJELLE: I think what we have before you today is 
15 our petition for a ruling on the initial case which was filed/ 
16 which is the board of trustees of Washington County Water 
17 Conservancy District vs. Keystone Conversions — no, with 
18 Keystone Conversions as respondent. That's why I got confused 
19 there. The parties have reached a stipulation that the hearing 
20 today would be limited to the issue of whether or not the fees 
21 which have been imposed pursuant to a rule that is attached to 
22 our petition. And I do have an extra copy for the court of our 
23 petition and the exhibits. It is, in fact, an impact fee. The 
24 parties have also stipulated that the district has the power to 
25 make and enforce all reasonable rules and regulations for the 
management, control, delivery, use and distribution of its 
water. So Keystone has raised some additional issues both in 
its answer to our petition and in its separate complaint which 
was consolidated. And I'll (inaudible) characterize it other 
than I will say they focus primarily on whether or not the 
actions that we took were in fact arbitrary and capricious or 
illegal for some other reason. And we have stipulated that 
those issues can be reserved for later, to be addressed later 
in the proceedings. So right now before the court is solely 
the issue of whether or not the fees that we have imposed meet 
the statutory definition of what is an impact fee. 
Fair statement? 
MR. REECE: Fair, yeah. Your Honor, did the court — 
I had this hand delivered up to the court yesterday morning. 
You didn't get a copy of the trial memorandum (inaudible)? 
THE COURT: Oh, it came in yesterday. I think you can 
probably make the speech as well as I can now, Mr. Reece, on 
that sort of thing. So it's not much use to me coming in late 
like that. 
MR. REECE: I think we can go through and outline the 
issues before the court. 
THE COURT: Well, let me make something clear to you. 
I do not have time to take another case under advisement. If 
this is an issue that involves materials that should have been 
provided to me earlier than this so that I would have some idea 
1 in advance what you are talking about, then this hearing will 
2 have to be postponed. I haven't had the materials in advance. 
3 And I am not in the position to be able to take on another 
4 assignment as a case under advisement after hearing some 
5 J smattering of evidence or argument here. I just don't have 
6 time to do it. 
7 MR. REECE: There is a very --
8 THE COURT: And so if it's something that's narrow 
9 enough that it's just simply a matter of some evidence and 
10 argument here and a decision, that's fine. But if it involves 
11 digesting all of this, no, it's not. 
12 MS. HJELLE: Your Honor, we would certainly submit 
13 that it is narrow enough. It is simply a question of looking 
14 at the definition of the statute, looking at the black and 
15 white language of our regulation and saying, how do they 
16 interrelate with one another? Does our regulation meet or not 
17 meet the definition of the statute? We would submit that any 
18 other arguments and issues raised in the trial memorandum are 
19 simply irrelevant to that question. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. REECE: My response to that, these are very 
22 complicated issues. That's why we gave the court the trial 
23 memorandum. I apologize they got to the court yesterday 
24 morning as opposed to maybe two days prior to the hearing. But 
25 the issues are very complicated, as Mrs. -- or Ms. Hjelle 
1 suggests. It's a matter of looking at the regulations, seeing 
2 what's happened there. And the exhibits are in connection with 
3 their minutes and their hearing both on June 12 and on 
4 July 17 ' and applying that to the statute. Now, that would 
5 take -- that's -- it's complicated. It's not a matter 
6 (inaudible) arguments are, that's the end of it. (Inaudible.) 
7 THE COURT: I guess you know my next question, Mr. 
8 Reece. What did you think I was going to do with this bound 
9 volume when you submitted it yesterday and it was delivered to 
10 me yesterday afternoon? 
11 MR. REECE: I hoped that you would have a chance to 
12 read it and (inaudible). 
13 THE COURT: When? 
14 MR. REECE: Yesterday afternoon. 
15 THE COURT: Let's be realistic, Mr. Reece. 
16 MR. REECE: The point I'm trying to make to the court 
17 is this. We are not going to be able to resolve this. These 
18 issues here, filed by the petitioner, were filed for a general 
19 hearing on this date. They published notice in the paper. 
20 They published in three public places, I guess. (Inaudible) 
21 but required by the statute published this notice. Court can 
22 take record or note for the record there was no one here except 
23 for my clients. And so, as far as between us, we would prefer 
24 to continue the matter until the court has time to review the 
25 trial memorandum until the court has time to be more prepared 
1 to go through and see what we have here. My point simply is, 
2 this is too complicated for the court. It!s an issue that 
3 undoubtedly will be up on appeal. Itfs something the court 
4 ought to spend some time reviewing. Having not even read the 
5 petition for this morning, Your Honor, the court, I think, 
6 would be (inaudible) to spend the extra time, read through our 
7 common memorandum and (inaudible). 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Reece, notice of this hearing was 
9 given two months ago. 
10 MR. REECE: That's correct. 
11 THE COURT: And you filed an appearance more than a 
12 month ago. Why is it that you are only filing your trial 
13 memorandum fewer than 24 hours before the hearing? 
14 MR. REECE: Ifm — my schedule, Your Honor, and Ifm 
15 lucky I got it to the court (inaudible) even before the 
16 hearing. 
17 THE COURT: Well, Ifm not going to consider it for 
18 this hearing. Itfs unrealistic. And it doesn't meet the 
19 requirements of the rules. And if that results in what you 
20 think is a poor decision and you end up going on appeal and 
21 spending your client's money for appeal instead of getting 
22 things into the court here on time, I guess that's one way to 
23 approach it. 
24 MR. REECE: So the court's (inaudible) review on 
25 request? 
1 THE COURT: I don't even know what the matter is other 
2 than a little bit that I have heard here. 
3 Now, Miss Hjelle, you say that these are things that 
4 are raised by your petition, but what is this process that you 
5 are undertaking by this notice of petition and hearing? 
6 MS. HJELLE: Your Honor, under the water conservancy 
7 act, which begins at 17 (a)-2-1401, there is a provision by 
8 which I would refer the court to 17 (a)-2-1442. This happens to 
9 be a highlighted version. And I have to admit, I didn't make 
10 an extra copy. It's just highlighted some of the language. 
11 But perhaps that would clarify things for the court. 
12 I Essentially, we are empowered to bring a petition for what I 
13 would call the equivalent of declaratory judgment and an action 
14 taken by our board. Well, until we get to the second to the 
15 last sentence of this section, it looks like another of the 
16 legislature's attempts to create some kind of process in the 
17 court without reference to any of the rules of the court. Then 
18 I it says, "The Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern and matters 
19 of pleading and practice where not otherwise specified herein." 
20 So from this statute you are taking it that a petition itself 
21 can be considered just upon a notice of hearing, the notice of 
22 hearing being specified in the statute or at least the notice 
23 of filing specified. And there's sort of a backhanded 
24 reference to a notice of hearing on the petition, in the way 
25 this is phrased. And then, what is the court supposed to do? 
1 Is this a trial? Is it a motion hearing? What is it? You are 
2 asking me to guess what the legislature was thinking, if they 
3 were thinking at all, when they passed this sort of thing? 
4 MS. HJELLE: I guess -- maybe ITm oversimplifying it. 
5 But I think if you would allow me to begin my argument and 
6 begin it, see how far I get with it. To me it's --
7 THE COURT: I'm still wondering about what procedure 
8 we are in. Am I being asked to grant a motion or to grant a 
9 petition? What do you think the procedure is that we are 
10 following? 
11 MS. HJELLE: Yes, you are being asked to grant a 
12 petition. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MS. HJELLE: May I refer with my client for just one 
15 minute? He seems to desire to say something. 
16 MR. THOMPSON: Do you mind if I add to the court and 
17 make this a little more informal? 
18 THE COURT: Do you mind? 
19 MR. REECE: I don't mind, Your Honor. 
20 MR. THOMPSON: The reason this was in the water 
21 conservancy statute is the district's not just ours, but around 
22 the state we are dealing with financing and water contracts and 
23 rules that had brought public interest. They had to know that 
24 they, in fact, were going to be legal and enforceable, because 
25 they were borrowing large amounts of money. They were building 
significant infrastructure. And so the purpose of this section 
was to provide a way that when the board took an action, they 
could go ask where it was important, ask the court for 
declaratory judgment that what they had done was either legal 
or illegal, so that they didn't move forward in an arena on 
shaky legal grounds. And I think what the legislature, at 
least my understanding this has always been, that their 
intent -- and we have used this on a couple of other occasions, 
particularly in some financing — what the court -- what the 
legislature was concerned about is that as you are building in 
this infrastructure, and the courts have been (inaudible) the 
water system, that there would be a way that people depending 
on it knew that the action was final, it was legal and 
non-appealable so you had some certainty that that action 
wasn't just a whim of an appointed body, but you had kind of a 
second look at that, a fairly quick look at it, so that as you 
move forward making those policies or entering the contracts 
that you knew they were going to be valid and enforceable. 
That was the purpose of the statute and the reason that that 
was in there. And you see it used in districts, particularly 
seeing it used extensively in the Central Utah Project and 
other places. And we have used it on occasion rarely. 
THE COURT: You mentioned something like a declaratory 
judgment process. 
MR. THOMPSON: Well, it really is a declaratory 
1 judgment. This is what it is. Now, whether we -- you know, we 
2 think we followed the statute correctly. That was the intent 
3 of the background what's passed. And that's how it's being 
4 used in (inaudible) around the state. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
6 MS. HJELLE: Your Honor, if I may make a couple of 
7 other points. And I may not have the citation with me. But 
8 there is a section of this statute that is sequential to 1442. 
9 I thought I had made copies, but I am having a hard time 
10 finding it. Oh, wait. 1444. (Inaudible) 1444. "All cases in 
11 which there may arise a validity — a question of validity," et 
12 cetera, et cetera — I'll skip all this kind of thing. Let's 
13 say, "the question shall be advanced as a matter of immediate 
14 public interest and concern and heard at the earliest practical 
15 moment. The court shall be open at all times for purposes of 
16 this part." Secondly, I would like to submit --
17 MR. THOMPSON: Separation of branches. 
18 THE COURT: I'm not sure that's a concept that exists. 
19 At least not in the constitution of Utah. 
20 MS. HJELLE: It's certainly my understanding under a 
21 stipulation — and this is my copy of the stipulation that I 
22 signed and returned to opposing counsel. It doesn't have 
23 opposing counsel's signature. But I assume there is one. 
24 MR. REECE: There is one. In fact, Your Honor, I've 
25 got a — it should have been (inaudible) by this court. 
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THE COURT: I think I saw this in the file. 
MR. REECE: (Inaudible) signed copy of the order 
yesterday. 
THE COURT: Oh, that's where it was. I received it 
yesterday with the order. I'm not sure where it is. But I 
have seen it. Thank you. 
MS. HJELLE: It was certainly my understanding that we 
had a stipulation that the portion of the hearing on whether or 
not this is an impact fee could go forward today. And, 
frankly, I'm a little bit unprepared to even hear that there 
was an objection to having a hearing. I think that — of 
course, counsel has the trial memorandum. And maybe that's the 
reason for it. But — 
THE COURT: Well, it says the court shall be open at 
all times. 
MS. HJELLE: (Inaudible.) I don't know if that's good 
to submit to you or not. 
MR. REECE: (Inaudible), Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you planned then to present oral 
argument or any evidence also? Or is it really the evidence 
not in dispute, it's a question of interpretation? 
MS. HJELLE: I don't think the evidence is in dispute. 
I think probably — obviously, I have Mr. Thompson here if 
there was some clarity. If we got to that point, I suppose 
that could be something that can be ruled on at the time. But 
1 my anticipation will be that we would make our arguments and 
2 the court would rule on what it could rule on today, and you 
3 would make that decision. I mean, if it canTt be done, it 
4 can't. I still have hope of persuading you that these issues 
5 are not that complex, that they are pretty straight forward, 
6 that you can make that simple narrow question ruling on that 
7 simple narrow question today, and that the rest of the issues 
8 raised -- counsel has the opportunity to bring those up to you 
9 in oral argument. (Inaudible) convince you that they are 
10 significant enough or add some complexity that I don't think is 
11 there, then, perhaps, we may need to have a continuance. But I 
12 think this could be ruled on today based on the material facts 
13 that are before you in the petition and the exhibits. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let's go ahead with 
15 your presentation then. 
16 MS. HJELLE: All right. Thank you, Your Honor. I 
17 appreciate that. I won't belabor the point that we filed a 
18 petition. The attachment to the petition, Your Honor, is the 
19 final rules and regulations of the secondary retail water 
20 service for the LaVerkin Creek area. In addition, there is an 
21 engineer's study. And I think I already handed you that, the 
22 copy we brought with us today for you on that. At any rate, as 
23 I indicated earlier, we think it's a very simple question of 
24 looking at the salient, the relevant language. It's a long 
25 regulation. But I think we can focus in on the material parts 
1 of the regulation and look at whether those indeed meet or do 
2 not meet the terms that make them an impact fee. So I think 
3 thatfs a simple question that we are submitting to you today. 
4 If I could just give you, if I could, some background 
5 of why we did this and how we got here. The water district, 
6 obviously, is charged with conserving and developing water for 
7 the people in Washington County. But we have our ways of doing 
8 business. And, under law, we are entitled to determine how 
9 we'll go about conserving and developing and providing water. 
10 I And, fundamentally, the water district is a wholesaler, for 
11 lack of a better term. In other words, we do not go out and 
12 sell to individuals, individual lots, individual developments 
13 even for the most part. We primarily provide water to 
14 municipalities. And then they go on and do whatever business 
15 they do with it. We primarily do that by way of contractual 
16 arrangements and the like. We also have some irrigation 
17 companies. And there are some exceptional situations that 
18 aren't relevant here today. So we are a wholesaler of waters, 
19 is the way I would put that. 
20 In that vane, sometime ago, we entered into an 
21 agreement with the town of Toquerville and the Toquerville 
22 secondary — and the Toquerville Irrigation Company to provide 
23 a system for secondary water, irrigation water within the town 
24 of Toquerville. And to do that, the board was created. And an 
25 organization called Toquerville Secondary Water System was 
1 created. And the district financed and constructed the 
2 infrastructure and, in order to ensure payment, basically 
3 retains title to the infrastructure while payment is being 
4 made. But, over time, the intention is that that system would 
5 be owned and operated by the town of Toquerville. The board of 
6 that entity we call TSWS, is two members are appointed by the 
7 water district. Two members are appointed by the town of 
8 Toquerville. Then those four members select a water user in 
9 Toquerville for a fifth member. So it is dominated by 
10 Toquerville. But the district certainly has a voice. 
11 Okay. So that system has been put in place and is now 
12 serving within the town of Toquerville. However, it became 
13 apparent to us that Keystone Development would be likely coming 
14 to the district rather than to TSWS to obtain secondary -- I 
15 guess, I mean we are presuming secondary water service within 
16 J the city limits of Toquerville where we already have this other 
17 system in place. So the district basically felt it was 
18 appropriate to rationally evaluate whether and on what terms it 
19 I would ever do something outside of what is already done through 
20 TSWS. And that's what these regulations really are. They are 
21 the district's attempt to figure out how to respond in a 
22 rational way to appending requests that we can see coming in 
23 the door. 
24 Initially, when we looked at it, we more or less 
25 presumed that this would be an impact fee type situation. And 
1 we started down that road. But, as digging into this and 
2 trying to meet the terms of that statute, it became pretty 
3 apparent to me that it was something like fitting a square peg 
4 in a round hole. Nothing really jived between what we were 
5 doing and the terms of that statute. And that's what I would 
6 like to focus on before the court right now. 
7 First of all, I would like to give to the court, if I 
8 could, a few of the definitions that I think are the relevant 
9 definitions from the statute. And, first of all, I would like 
10 to focus on the definition of Utah code section 1136-102-7 (a) 
11 I in impact fee. And I think this is the really central part of 
12 J our argument, Your Honor. An impact fee is a payment of money 
13 J imposed upon a development activity as a condition of 
14 J development approval. To really jump ahead of my argument, 
15 what we are really telling you is when we get to our 
16 regulations — and I have the salient parts to hand you at that 
17 time -- we don't ever have anything in there that says before 
18 I you can develop you must pay us money or in order to be able to 
19 develop you must pay us money. It's not there. So I'll go on 
20 from there, Your Honor. It's kind of jumping ahead a little 
21 bit. 
22 But, fundamentally, in order for us to impose an 
23 impact fee, we must be able to be in a position to approve or 
24 disapprove a development activity or be causally linked --
25 jumping to what I know is in their trial brief -- causally 
1 linked, you could say, to approval or disapproval to a 
2 development activity. 
3 Now, the next step, addition I would like to focus on, 
4 is number three. Development activity means any construction 
5 or expansion of a building, structure, or use, any change in 
6 use of a building, structure, or any change in use of the land 
7 that creates additional demand and need for public facilities. 
8 So, there again, the district must be able to approve or 
9 disapprove construction, expansion, change and use of a 
10 building, structures, or land to simplify that definition down. 
11 Furthermore, it is that, those activities which might -- which 
12 would create a demand and need for public facilities. So that 
13 leads me to the third definition I would like to focus the 
14 court on, which is the definition of public facilities. And if 
15 you look at that definition, the -- there are the following 
16 capital facilities that have a life expectancy of 10 or more 
17 years and are owned or operated by or on behalf of a political 
18 subdivision. And I would focus you on subpart (a), which is, 
19 includes water supply and distribution facilities, okay, which 
20 is essentially what the issue is again, kind of jumping ahead. 
21 I wouldn't have brought this up except I know it's in the trial 
22 memorandum, and this is the only other issue I could see that 
23 would be relevant, in my opinion, from that. 
24 Now, so the facilities in question here, well, I'll 
25 skip that, because it really becomes relevant when we look at 
1 our regulation. Okay. But those are the definitions that I 
2 think are relevant. So our position simply is that the 
3 district is not approving development as defined there. And I 
4 would like to look at our regulation now, if I could, Your 
5 Honor. 
6 There are two parts to this. And I'll just give them 
7 I both to you at the same time, if I can get these separated. 
8 (Inaudible) these are just, counsel, out of our 
9 regulation, that paragraph five you alluded to in your memo and 
10 itfs attached exhibit. 
11 Your Honor, I would like to first focus on Exhibit A. 
12 This is a fee structure. And this is the exhibit that sets 
13 forth, when -- what triggers the imposition of the fee, for 
14 lack of a better way of putting it. 
15 Okay. Now, looking at Exhibit A, paragraph one, the 
16 initial water availability fee is due and payable when the 
17 developer requests water service. Okay. Now, as far as we are 
18 concerned, as a water district, he could have a subdivision 
19 approved, he could not have a subdivision approved; he could 
20 have his plat drafted, he could not have his draft platted. 
21 It's his decision when he comes in and asks us for water 
22 service. I could speculate, for example, that a developer 
23 might say, I want a subdivision. I don't want to go to TSWS. 
24 Instead, I want to get my water from the water district. And 
25 before I even start platting out my subdivision, I want to 
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them with water; at which point, we forego opportunities to 
market that water elsewhere. We forego opportunities to 
utilize our pipes. We can take water in our pipes all over the 
county ultimately. I mean, Ifm simplifying it down. But, 
fundamentally, when we put a pipeline in place, it has a 
certain capacity, and somebody comes to us and asks for water, 
and we say we will give you water. Go ahead and make your 
plans on that basis. Werve got to reserve that water in some 
way. And we have devoted facilities regardless of whether they 
are already in place or they intend to build them, we are 
reserving the water, we are reserving, you know, planning 
infrastructure and so forth. I don!t think that!s the same 
thing as what's referred to as an impact fee. 
Now, then again, I would like to reiterate the point 
that it's all voluntary. Okay. I would also like to point out 
to the court while we are on this point, that we think that 
this type of arrangement is mandated by another section of 
water conservancy district statute, section 17(a)-2-1432 . And 
perhaps without belaboring the point, it talks about the need 
1 what I presented to you is what we do with regard to -- I mean, 
2 our regulation states that there is nothing lurking out there 
3 with regard to TSWS. I do have the contract but, 
4 fundamentally, it's just a water system that's managed by that 
5 board. And we don't have any approval or authorities that 
6 I aren't -- and I guess I think, still, that's pretty irrelevant 
7 I because, once again, it comes back to somebody not wanting to 
go through any of those other routes, whatever they may be, out 
9 | in the world for doing their business. Do they want to come to 
10 | us and ask us for service which we, fundamentally, are not 
11 | desiring to provide given the resources that we have to provide 
12 I for other obligations to the public. So --
13 All right. Now, I would just like to go back to 
14 Exhibit A, if I could, Your Honor. Number two is a standby 
15 fee. That is due and payable after construction of additions 
16 to the system. I guess without, I haven't highlighted these or 
17 separately set forth these provisions of the regulations. But 
18 the regulations basically provide that if you wanted to connect 
19 to our system and get water from us in this secondary 
20 irrigation water, then you got to meet our standards in 
21 constructing your pipes. And you got to have our engineer look 
22 it over and so on, so forth. And then we own it. So, 
23 essentially, as folks come and say we want to be part of your 
24 system, we are saying, fine. Pay the water availability fee. 
25 And you look over our standards. And you construct at some 
1 point, whenever. That's at their discretion when they do it. 
2 At some point you construct the pipes, you meet our standards, 
3 then you start paying the standby fee once we have approved the 
4 construction and the addition of the pipeline system to our 
5 system. 
6 Paragraph two of our regulations indicate that if a 
7 community is unable to provide that water service, they have to 
8 submit a letter asking for it. So there is a written request. 
9 That really relates back to paragraph one of Exhibit A, I 
10 think. 
11 THE COURT: Um-hmm. 
12 MS. HJELLE: Item number three in Exhibit A is a 
13 connection fee of $400 per lot. Then, thereafter, a water 
14 service fee, which is related to actual service of water. So 
15 you switch from a standby fee to a higher fee that reflects the 
16 fact that you are now hooked up to the system and receiving 
17 water. So that's it. None of these fees, clearly, are 
18 conditioned upon approval of development, of a development 
19 (inaudible). It simply isnft part of the deal. 
20 Now, I would like now to refer to the other little 
21 page that I had handed you, which is actually an excerpt from 
22 the regulations. It is paragraph five from those regulations. 
23 And, again, I mention that I allude to this because I was 
24 alerted to the argument by the trial memorandum of counsel. 
25 And to make an attempt to state their argument, they are 
1 basically saying that if you look at the last phrase there, 
2 that they have to pay the appropriate fees prior to 
3 construction of any intended additions to the district system. 
4 Now, they could construct other irrigation systems that aren't 
5 going to connect to ours. We have nothing to do with that. Or 
6 connect to TSWS or whatever. But if they are intending to 
7 connect to our system through this process that's outlined in 
8 these regulations, then they have to sign these water 
9 application and agreements for each lot, which provides some 
10 legally binding ability for us to collect what we need to 
11 collect and manage it in the way we need to manage it. 
12 The argument, as I understand it, is that somehow 
13 makes this an impact fee because there is a required approval 
14 prior to that construction. But this takes us back to the 
15 definitions page that I initially argued from. It starts at 
16 the top 11-36-102 definitions. This gets back to the 
17 I definition both of public facilities and development activity 
18 and development approval. This kind of ties it altogether. 
19 These pipes that are referred to in that paragraph five are not 
20 development activities. They are the public facilities that 
21 the development activities cause a need for, if you see where 
22 I'm going. So we are still not approving a development 
23 activity. These folks are engaging in development activity 
24 however they choose to in accordance with whatever approvals 
25 and regulations other entities have authority to grant or not 
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grant. Or, when they come to us and want to connect to our 
system, then they are adding an infrastructure to our public 
facility. And we are saying that becomes part of our public 
facility. It will meet our standards and we will approve that. 
But it's entirely different from a development activity. So 
that's why we don't think that argument has any merit when it 
arises. 
I guess, Your Honor, I've got a couple notes here 
about the brief. I think maybe I'll just summarize those by 
saying that we think those are (inaudible) facts. We simply 
don't think what other water districts do in other situations, 
what Toquerville does in its culinary water system, what other 
municipalities do in their culinary water systems, what the 
district might do in some other situation under separate 
contract or whatever it might be are relevant. We think the 
relevant question is, what does our regulation say and what 
does the statute say, and have we in fact made some payment of 
fee a condition of development approval. And we submit to the 
court that we have not. And, therefore, it is a simple matter 
to rule that this is not an impact fee. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: What's the consequence if it is an impact 
fee? 
MS. HJELLE: If it is an impact fee, we would do 
something somewhat different from what we have done here. 
There are more formalities. And this gets back, Your Honor, to 
1 my befuddlement in trying to meet the impact fee statute. You 
2 have to do what's called a capital facilities plan. And just 
3 to give you an idea of why I ran into trouble as counsel for 
4 the district, you have to do both a capital facilities plan and 
5 an impact fee analysis. There are two requirements. And you 
6 go through some specific procedures of notice and the like and 
7 hearings and the like. So that simplifies it. But there 
8 are -- it is a strict procedure, for lack of a better term. 
9 There are outlined procedures. What we have done in this 
10 instance is, we have done an analysis. We had our engineer do 
11 an analysis which might be similar to what an impact fee 
12 analysis would be. And I know that counsel would tell you that 
13 I they were critical of that, that it was not sufficient to meet 
14 the standards of the impact fee analysis. And that could, 
15 theoretically, be an issue if this were an impact fee. And we 
16 don't have a capital facilities plan which is also required. 
17 I Now, okay. If the court would indulge me for just one 
18 I moment here. Before imposing impact fees, each local political 
19 subdivision shall prepare a capital facilities plan. The plan 
20 shall identify demands placed upon an existing public 
21 facilities by new development activity. I look at that. And I 
22 say, well, gosh. I don?t know how to do that for the water 
23 district because we have existing contracts. And we have big 
24 pipelines we are going to build. And we are going to sell 
25 water under contracts to municipalities. And they are going to 
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The set apart is the proposed means by which the 
political subdivision would meet those demands. Same thing. 
City of St. George is trying to figure out how to meet the 
demands of the development which it approves within its 
boundaries. We are trying to figure out how to build 
reservoirs, how to make, put pipelines in place that will 
deliver quantities of water that St. George, at some point in 
time, would ask us to deliver to them. 
So, we have no plans of, you know, again, looking at 
the definition of development activity, looking at what 
buildings are going to be built, what structures are going to 
be built and so forth. That we leave to those we can contract 
with. Thatfs a little (inaudible) from what you asked. But, 
fundamentally, getting back to the question you asked, there 
are procedures that are more elaborate. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. HJELLE: And I guess to add one more point, if I 
could, so we believe that our duty in passing this fee under 
our water district statute is to be rational, I mean, is the 
standard that applies to governmental entities in the actions 
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that they do. We can!t be so irrational that it would be 
appropriate for a court to come 
for the judgment of our court. 
THE COURT: Okay. All 
MR. REECE: Thank you, 
can just really carefully focus 
definitions --
THE COURT: Um-hmm. 
MR. REECE: — because 
really comes down, at least the 
today. And I!m not going to use 
in and substitute its judgment 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
right. Mr. Reece. 
very much, Your Honor. If I 
with you on these 
I think that's where this case 
issues what's before the court 
i the exhibit that Mrs. -- or 
that Miss Hjelle produced, because I think these are a few 
definitions that I think are applicable that are not included 
in there. I'm looking at page 440 of volume one of the code. 
I donft know if you have that, i 
the 2001? 
f the court has the new ones, 
THE COURT: No. We have the 2000 in here today. They 
will be gone by tomorrow. 
MR. REECE: You know wh 
(inaudible) photocopies of that? 
THE COURT: Let's see. 
at? 
MR, REECE: Section Uta 
sorry 101 and 201. 
THE COURT: Have they b 
at, could I trouble the court 
What section are you looking 
h Code 11-36-101 and 102 -- I'm 
een changed since 2000? 
1 MR. REECE: I guess not. Sorry. (Inaudible) ' been 
2 I modified. I believe they are the same, Your Honor. So I guess 
3 we are okay (inaudible). 
4 THE COURT: All right. 
5 MR. REECE: Looking first at section 11-36-201 subpart 
6 (1)(a), states that, "Each local subdivision shall comply with 
7 the requirements of this chapter before establishing or 
8 modifying any impact fee." You pop over to 101, just a couple 
9 paragraphs before that, 101. 
10 THE COURT: Itfs 102, isn't it, where all the 
11 I definitions are? 101 is just the title. 
12 MR. REECE: Yeah, I apologize. 101 -- 102, subsection 
13 I (8) (a). It states that, "Local political subdivisions means a 
14 county, a municipality or a special district created under 
15 title 17(a) special districts." Now, part of the argument 
16 that's being advanced here today is because Washington County 
17 Water Conservancy District is a special district, they don't 
18 approve or disapprove development activity and, therefore, they 
19 don't come within the meaning of the impact fee statute. The 
20 fact the statute itself includes them within this definition, 
21 and suggests that the legislature, when they created this 
22 statute, believed that special districts could in fact approve 
23 or disapprove a development activity. Now, if you'll look up 
24 on subsection (7)(a), this is the citation of Miss Hjelle cited 
25 earlier. States, "An impact fee means that payment of money 
1 imposed upon" -- I'm going to put in quotes, "development 
2 activity" as a condition of" -- I!m putting quotes again, 
3 "development approval." 
4 I Now, those sections of the code, development approval 
5 states, means any written authorization from a local political 
6 subdivision -- that would include a special district -- that 
7 authorizes the commencement of development activity. Doesn't 
8 say to give final plat approval or to give plat approval or 
9 give even preliminary plat approval. It just says that 
10 authorizes upon -- sorry, written authorization from a 
11 political subdivision that authorizes commencement of a 
12 development activity. Now, subsection (3) above that states 
13 that, "Any development activity means any construction or 
14 expansion of a building, structure, or use; any change in use 
15 of a building or structure; or any changes in the use of the 
16 land that creates a (inaudible) demand and need for public 
17 facility." So we are not in a situation here where we have to 
18 come to the board of the district and say will you please give 
19 me subdivision approval so I can put in this water facility. 
20 That's not what the statute requires. It says if you have to 
21 pay a fee before you can go ahead with any development 
22 activity, that fee then, by definition, if it is paid to a 
23 political subdivision, which would include specifically include 
24 a district, service district, that fee is an impact fee. 
25 And as a result of that, you have to have a capital 
1 facilities plan. And the court, I'm sure, is very much aware 
2 of capital facilities plans. Every political subdivision has 
3 them. They are detailed. They show what they cost to build 
4 their structure. What do they have right now? What does it 
5 I cost to build the duct right now? I might add, in my trial 
6 memorandum — trial brief, the Weber Water Conservancy District 
7 has its capital facilities plan with their impact fees and 
8 their impact fee analysis. The Ash Creek Service District has 
9 I a capital facilities plan with their fees. Service districts, 
10 water districts, whether it be Weber, Washington County, it 
11 J doesn't matter, they oftentimes do have fees they impose as a 
12 condition of commencement of a development activity. And, 
13 again, that does not mean final plat approval or preliminary 
14 plat approval for a development. It just means that if you 
15 want to put in a system for secondary water and use us, you got: 
16 to pay a fee before you put that system in, which is exactly 
17 what these regulations require. 
18 Now, if I can, further, the other paragraphs that I 
19 think are relevant here, Miss Hjelle pointed to paragraph 11 of 
20 102 — 102, yeah, about public facilities. And that talks 
21 about, specifically, only the following capital facilities that 
22 have a life expectancy of 10 or more years, and are owned or 
23 operated by or on behalf of a local political subdivision; 
24 namely, water supply and distribution facilities. Well, if you 
25 read through their regulations, when we put in these 
1 are asking us to pay for the entire costs of those facilities. 
2 That's why that's different. That's why it comes within the 
3 purview of the impact fee statutes, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Well, go ahead and continue. I would like 
5 to see the connection of the system improvements. 
6 MR. REECE: Even if you just look at strictly the 
7 public facilities part of that, Your Honor, they are asking us 
8 to put in water, it will affect, and then they will then own 
9 the water rights, the water supply, treatment, and treatment 
10 facilities. It comes squarely within paragraph 11(a) in any 
11 event. And I think what's kind of ironic about this whole 
12 thing, Your Honor -- hang on a second, here — and I'll submit 
13 this to the court, is there is a special agreement that the 
14 water district has with my client that they will in fact 
15 produce the water for my client, supply the water for my 
16 client, not the TSWS or anybody else, that they will provide 
17 that water on the benefit -- on behalf of my client. I hand 
18 you what's been marked as an agreement --
19 MS. HJELLE: Your Honor, I would like to object to 
20 this. I don't see how this agreement is relevant to the 
21 question of whether our regulation meets the definition of an 
22 impact fee. I think you are opening up a whole new area that 
23 has nothing to do with the petition and the issue before the 
24 court today. 
25 THE COURT: What is the connection, Mr. Reece? 
1 MR. REECE: This specifically requires them, or 
2 requires them to produce water for my client. Part of our 
3 argument is we don't have to produce the water unless you 
4 request it. Well, that's inaptable to my client. They are 
5 required to produce the water for my client. 
6 MS. HJELLE: Your Honor, there are issues of this -- I 
7 mean, first of all, is irrelevant. I mean, even if we had some 
8 obligation, which we are prepared to deal with this fully, and 
9 I think this really relates to the issues of their complaint 
10 that we stipulated would be addressed at a later date. We are 
11 fully prepared to address this, but -- I don't know. You know, 
12 it's just not relevant to the question of whether we have an 
13 impact fee. Assuming their argument is correct, and we had 
14 some contractual obligation, which we do not, to do that, first 
15 of all, we have TSWS. And we have fulfilled that. But, 
16 secondly, it's still a voluntary situation that they entered 
17 into by contract. It's not the kind of situation that is 
18 relevant to the question of whether our regulation, which is 
19 not solely focused on them, admittedly, a response to an 
20 anticipated request from them. But it is a broadly applicable 
21 public regulation of the water district. This contract is a 
22 separate issue. 
23 MR. REECE: It's specifically against the issue of 
24 whether they say, well, you want water, it's request for fee. 
25 It's not. We need to get the water from them. They know that. 
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approval. Now, whether the Toquerville -- even if, Your 
Honor — hold your thought (inaudible) -- but even if we didn!t 
have to pay Washington County Water Service District, that was 
a pass-through fee to Toquerville Secondary Water System, that 
doesn't lessen the fact that it's a condition of development 
activity. 
THE COURT: Well, I think what Ifm getting from your 
argument is a little bit different interpretation of the terms 
"development activity" and "development approval." 
If I can state your argument the way I understand it, 
you say you are being required by the district to pay money. 
You say that is imposed upon your development activity. You 
say that that development activity is the creation of a 
subdivision. You say that the city or town -- which is it, 
Toquerville? 
MR. REECE: It's a city now. 
THE COURT: City? You say that the city requires you 
to have these public facilities in in order to have, to get the 
city's authority to commence your development activity, which 
is development of the subdivision, and, therefore, since the 
1 development approval is a written authorization from a local 
2 J political subdivision, which is the city, to authorize your 
3 development of a subdivision, and that development of the 
4 subdivision creates the need for public facilities, then the 
5 I fee imposed by a second political subdivision is still just 
6 J necessarily an impact fee even though that second political 
7 I subdivision, the water district has nothing to do with 
8 I approving your development at all. Of course it approves the 
9 construction that connects to its own facilities. 
10 MR. REECE: Sure. 
11 THE COURT: You wouldnft expect someone to be able to 
12 say I need some electrical power and I!ll tell Utah Power & 
13 Light -- in the olden days -- how I!m going to hook it up, and 
14 they'll just have to like it or lump it. You'd have to comply 
15 with everything Utah Power & Light requires back in those days,. 
16 So is that what you are saying, Mr. Reece? 
17 MR. REECE: In essence, when they — when the district 
18 says to us, okay, put in a secondary system, you have to do 
19 this, this, and this, and you need to pay us this water -- I 
20 forget how they call it, this water application fee, before you 
21 can begin that and follow our regulations on what you put in 
22 there, that is part and parcel of the whole development 
23 process. And it doesn't matter whether we have to have that as 
24 a condition of final plat approval or not. If we come back 
25 even at a later time and say, okay, maybe now we want to put in 
1 position to do anything about it. All right. 
2 Miss Hjelle, what's your final argument on this? 
3 MS. HJELLE: Your Honor, I don!t want to belabor. I 
4 think most of the points that Mr. Reece raised were addressed 
5 in my original argument. 
6 I would like to just articulate one point in 
7 particular. The issue of the fact that local districts are — 
8 J special districts are referenced in the impact fee statute. We 
9 I recognize that there could be circumstances under which we 
10 would have to do an impact fee analysis and capital facilities 
11 I plan. Those would be circumstances where there is, for lack of 
12 I a better term, a causal relationship between the approval of 
13 J development activity and some action that we have to agree to 
14 do. And in the examples that Mr. Reece has given you, are 
15 exactly on point. You take Ash Creek Special Service District, 
16 the municipalities or the areas where they provide service, 
17 obviously, you have to have a sewer facility of some sort to 
18 get a building permit. And so they are contractually connected 
19 with the areas where they provide service that they will do 
20 that. And so they are going to impact the causal relationship. 
21 And there you get the impact fee analysis connection. If we 
22 voluntarily put ourselves in that position with regard to that 
23 there's — that our service is required in order to get 
24 development approval, that would be a different situation. But 
25 we haven't done that here. 
1 Toquerville has a separate way of providing all of 
2 these things. It has nothing to do with us except in so far, 
3 you might say, as our indirect link with TSWS. And even there, 
4 Your Honor, it is not a direct link because Toquerville 
5 requires, as I understand it, that a developer place the pipes 
6 in the ground. That it does not require a connection to 
7 receive water. So even there, the question of coming to us and 
8 asking for water would still be a step removed from any 
9 approval development activity. But there again, there is no 
10 linkage between the development approvals issued by the city of 
11 Toquerville in anything we are doing in these regulations that 
12 are before you today. They simply have no relationship to one 
13 another. And these other cases that he has brought up are 
14 cases where there is a relationship. 
15 THE COURT: So, but you are -- you are then 
16 contemplating a possibility where there are two local -- what's 
17 the term — local political subdivisions involved, and one's 
18 approval of a building permit is conditioned on another's 
19 approval of a sewer hookup and, therefore, the fee for the 
20 sewer hookup should be determined to be an impact fee? 
21 MS. HJELLE: I think there are circumstances that have 
22 to be dealt with on their own merits. And we certainly aren't 
23 saying there aren't circumstances where we wouldn't potentially 
24 have to do something like that. We, obviously, don't think 
25 this is one of them. We think this is, obviously, on its face, 
